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SUMMARY 
The multi-faction civil conflict in Yemen gained an international status on March 26, 2015 when 
a coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened at the request of the internationally-recognized 
Government of Yemen (GoY) to restore its authority and control after the Houthi rebels captured 
the Capital city Sanaa. However, the intervention was not commenced upon the authorization of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Instead, the GoY and the Coalition states invoked 
a twofold legal justification – (1) the intervention was launched following an invitation by the 
GoY, and (2) it constitutes an exercise of Yemen’s right to collective self-defense. The aim of 
this thesis is to put these two justifications to test by posing the following research question - 
does the Saudi Arabian military intervention in the ongoing civil war in Yemen comply with the 
jus ad bellum principle, as codified in international law? 
Chapter I discusses the causes of the conflict between the GoY and the Houthi rebels. I may 
appear on the surface that this is a classic example of an internationalized sectarian conflict in the 
Middle East, given that the Houthi rebels mainly represent the Zaydi Shi’a minority (supported 
by the Shi’a theocracy Iran) of the predominantly Sunni Yemen (the GoY is supported by Iran’s 
main Sunni rival Saudi Arabia). However, the root causes of Houthi disgruntlement are the 
decades-long marginalization of Zaydi political interests by the GoY and the poor governance 
structures that neglected the development of Zaydi-populated areas. After the influential Zaydi 
cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was assassinated in 2004, violent clashes erupted between the 
Houthi rebels and the GoY.  Even though the Arab Spring revolution in Yemen brought about a 
change of government, the still-dissatisfied Houthis used the UN-installed interim government’s 
lack of control over Yemeni territory to further expand their military presence. This resulted in 
the capture of Sanaa in September 2014 and the forced resignation of  Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, 
the President of Yemen. Hadi relocated to Aden, an interim capital, revoked his resignation, and 
not having received any form of UNSC assistance, requested the Coalition states to intervene in 
the conflict. 
Chapter II proceeds to devise a checklist of criteria for the legality of an intervention by 
invitation (IBI) where it lacks a UNSC authorization, exploring two potential legal justifications 
based on the Charter of the United Nations. First, the inapplicability of the Art.2(4) prohibition 
on the use of force on grounds of a valid invitation to intervene is discussed. Based on existing 
academic work, the interpretation of the elements of Art.2(4) is outlined, stressing that an IBI is 
not covered by Art.2(4) because it does not adversely affect a state’s international relations or 
territorial integrity, as the application of Art.2(4) would stipulate. However, the invitation to 
intervene must be valid, i.e. issued by the legitimate authority (effective control being a 
controversial sub-requirement for it), issued in the context of an internal armed conflict, and 
issued prior to the intervention. The invitation must also be clear, specific, ad hoc, and, according 
to state practice, pursuant to a legitimate aim, as there appears to be no general right to intervene 
in a civil war. 
Second, the thesis discusses the criteria for the exercise of the Art.51 right to collective self-
defense. It is argued that for the sake of the effectiveness of the right to self-defense, the notion of 
“armed attack” – the key criterion triggering Art.51 – should not be dependent on the 
attributability of an attack to another state. Instead, the occurrence of an “armed attack” ought to 
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depend on the gravity and the destructiveness of the attack. In context of collective self-defense, 
the victim state must first recognize that it has been a victim to an armed attack and request 
assistance similarly to the IBI doctrine. Furthermore, the measures taken in exercise of self-
defense must be necessary and proportionate to their repellent aim, and they must be reported to 
the UNSC and cease when the UNSC takes its own measures to restore international peace. 
Chapter III analyzes the compliance of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen with the criteria 
outlined prior. First, it is established that in absence of a valid intervention to intervene, the case 
would be covered by the Art.2(4) Prohibition on the use of force. Nevertheless, the UN-
recognized President Hadi is the competent authority to issue the invitation (assuming, however, 
that there is no effective control requirement, that the GoY benefits from a presumption of 
effective control, or that the lack of effective control is trumped by the subsequent UNSC 
recognition of the validity of the invitation). The letter sent to the Coalition states by President 
Hadi fulfils the established formal criteria, and the intervention in itself pursues a legitimate aim 
– the territorial unity of Yemen, the sovereignty of the GoY over the territory, and the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, the intervention in Yemen is legal 
according to the IBI doctrine. 
Second, the applicability of Art.51 to the case is scrutinized. No clear link of even overall control 
can be established between the Houthi rebels and Iran, which under strict traditional 
interpretation of Art.51 would automatically invalidate an Art.51 justification. However, as 
argued prior, it bears no impact on the conclusions of this thesis. Indeed, as the Houthis managed 
to seize the Capital of Yemen, along with multiple other large population centers, the GoY was 
clearly a victim to an armed attack for the purposes of Art.51. The self-defense measures were 
reported to the UNSC by the Coalition states, transferring Hadi’s letter to them which explicitly 
requested a military intervention pursuant to Art.51, thus complying with the procedural 
requirements. As the UNSC had yet to take any meaningful measures against the Houthis, the 
Coalition was, in principle, free to proceed with the intervention, which, given the rapidly 
increasing military capabilities and expansion of the Houthis, was indeed necessary to restore the 
GoY in power. However, the Coalition has failed to fully reinstall the legitimate GoY and its 
efforts have been misapplied to disproportionately target civilian population. Thus, while the 
military intervention in itself is a necessary and adequate measure to counter the Houthi threat, its 
execution appears to significantly violate the rules for the conduct of hostilities. Therefore, even 
if one assumes the Art.51 criteria to be met, thus justifying the Saudi-led intervention under the 
right to collective self-defense, the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) norms 
could nonetheless render it illegal. 
Therefore, in conclusion, the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen is legal on the grounds of 
a valid invitation to intervene removing it from the scope of Art.2(4), assuming that the GoY lack 
of effective control over Yemen does not prejudice its capacity to request an intervention. 
However, the application of the Art.51 right to self-defense is problematic due to the 
disproportionate targeting of purely civilian objectives. While this may not render the mere fact 
of the intervention illegal, as the situation clearly warranted international involvement, there is 
ample reason for further scrutiny under international humanitarian law. 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AL Arab League (formerly the League of Arab States) 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GoY Government of Yemen  
IBI Intervention by Invitation 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
  
6 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing multi-faction civil war in Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe. As of 2018, 40 000 
people are estimated to have been killed during hostilities,  3 million civilians have been 
internally displaced, and 22 million are in dire need for humanitarian assistance as Yemen faces 
widespread starvation, water contamination, and disease outbreaks.
1
 One of the main culprits 
behind the crisis - the March 26, 2015 Saudi Arabian-led military intervention - was commenced 
on the basis of an invitation by the internationally recognized interim Government of Yemen 
(GoY), as it struggled to regain control over the rebel-occupied territories and restore order in 
Yemen. 
However, despite the GoY request for assistance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
prior to the intervention, no authorization to use force was issued. The UNSC simply 
acknowledged the request without taking any meaningful action to restore stability in Yemen.
2
 
Nonetheless, a Coalition of the willing led by Saudi Arabia proceeded with military operations, 
justifying them on the grounds of an intervention by invitation (IBI) and the exercise of Yemen’s 
right to collective self-defense. 
Therefore, given the grave humanitarian crisis in Yemen, the lack of UNSC attention to the issue, 
and the increasing trend of foreign interventions in internal conflicts upon the invitation of the 
legitimate government (the ongoing civil war in Syria is a better-known example), this thesis puts 
forward a very topical research question: does the 2015 Saudi Arabian-led military 
intervention in Yemen comply with the jus ad bellum principle, as codified in international 
law? The research method is to put the two justifications offered by the Coalition states and the 
GoY to a test by interpreting the relevant rules on the use of force, devising universally 
applicable legality criteria for an IBI, and applying these criteria to the intervention in Yemen.  
In Chapter I, the main causes and events of the Yemeni conflict will be explained to highlight the 
relevant legal issues. Chapter II will discuss the interpretation of the relevant articles of the 
Charter of the United Nations (the Charter) by academics, tribunals, and state practice. The aim is 
to devise two separate lists of criteria for a lawful IBI, based on the two justifications – (1) 
inapplicability of the prohibition on the use of force due to a valid invitation to intervene; and (2) 
the applicability of the right to collective self-defense. Finally, Chapter III will apply these 
criteria to the intervention in Yemen to assess its legality. The conclusion will summarize the 
findings of the thesis, concisely answer the research question, and briefly comment on the 
potential future developments.  
While the concept of IBIs and the legality of the intervention in Yemen have already been subject 
to academic research, this thesis will contribute to the existing scholarship by providing a 
comprehensive list of criteria for the two possible legal justifications that can be applied to assess 
any other case of IBI. Because the criteria are based on emerging state practice and forward-
                                                 
1
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as 
referred to in “Key facts about the war in Yemen,” Al-Jazeera, March 26, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html    
2
 S.C. Res. 2216, U.N Doc. S/RES/2216 (2015). Available on: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2216(2015)   
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looking academic discussions, rather than a strict traditionalist interpretation of the Charter, the 
conclusions of the case study on Yemen also differ from those put forward in other works.
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CHAPTER I: CAUSES AND TIMELINE OF THE YEMENI CONFLICT 
Before proceeding to a legal analysis of the Yemeni civil war, it is necessary to explain the legal 
issue at hand to establish the relevant legal norms for further analysis. In that cause, the first 
chapter will first explain the history and the causes of the Houthi revolt against GoY and then 
outline the key events leading up to the intervention. 
1.1. Roots of the GoY-Houthi conflict 
Many different factions are involved in the Yemeni civil war opposing not only the government, 
but one another as well.
4
 However the main conflict triggering the intervention is between the 
UN-recognized interim GoY, led by President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the Houthi rebels.
5
  
The Houthi movement primarily comprises of the supporters of the al-Houthi family, native to 
the Saada governorate of the former North Yemen (See Annex I) and representing Zaydism – a 
branch of Shi’a Islam,6 followed by approximately 40% of Yemenis, residing primarily in North 
Yemen
7
 (the rest of the population is predominantly Sunni).
8
 This fact may suggest sectarian 
divisions as the cause of the conflict, and indeed North Yemen saw a rise in Sunni reformism and 
consequent anti-Zaydism in the 1980s.
9
 Nonetheless, a religion-based explanation of the conflict 
in Yemen grossly overlooks the complexities of the Yemeni history and its fractured tribal 
society.
10
 Instead, the root causes of the conflict concern domestic power dynamics and 
governance policies.
11
 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Tom Ruys and Luca Ferro, “Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-led 
Military Intervention in Yemen” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, No. 01 (January 2016): pp.61-
98. 
4
 The Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research in 2015 has identified five 
ongoing violent conflicts between various factions in Yemen. See “Conflict Barometer 2015” (Annual report,  
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2016), pp.166-167. Available on: https://hiik.de/conflict-
barometer/bisherige-ausgaben/?lang=en  
5
 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi 
Phenomenon (RAND Corporation, 2010), p.1 
6
 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples “Zaydi Shi’a”. Available on: 
http://minorityrights.org/minorities/zaydi-shias/, Accessed April 15, 2018. 
7
 North Yemen refers to the territories of the former Yemen Arab Republic, which ceased to exist upon the 
unification with South Yemen, a.k.a. People’s Democratic Republic of South Yemen in 1990. Its territories roughly 
correspond to those that are currently occupied by the Houthi rebels or fall under their influence. See, e.g., 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Yemen: History”. Available on: https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/The-age-of-
imperialism#ref45274.  Accessed April 15, 2018 
8
 Asher Orkaby, “Houthi Who?” Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-
east/2015-03-25/houthi-who 
9
 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, “Zaydi Shi’a” 
10
 Orkaby, “Houthi Who?”; Jacob Olidort, “The Truth About Sectarianism.” Foreign Affairs, January 25, 2016, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-01-25/truth-about-sectarianism  
11
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, pp.19-43. 
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First, there has historically been a significant distance between the local tribes in different regions 
of North Yemen and the government, particularly after a coup in 1962 ended the rule of Zaydi 
imams and created a republic based on Arab nationalism ideas.
12
 After Ali Abdullah Saleh came 
to power in North Yemen in 1978 and exercised a governance strategy, whereby formal 
sovereignty over the territory was retained without direct government control, actual governance 
was left up to local tribal leaders, amounting to de facto autonomy.
13
 Consequently, North 
Yemen has historically been deeply divided into different factions, some even seeking formal 
separation,
14
 which managed to avoid conflicts largely due to internal trade networks and the 
shared religious beliefs – Zaydism.15 
Second, as a consequence of the autonomy of regions in North Yemen, direct government 
involvement in social, economic, and infrastructure development was confined to the Capital city 
Sanaa and resource-rich regions, neglecting the rest of North Yemen.
16
 The government neglect 
and shared awareness and concern for issues like prosperity, education, healthcare, and 
employment, as well as the aforementioned rise in anti-Zaydism facilitated the development of a 
much deeper sense of common Zaydi identity in the 1980s. In the 1990s, this shared identity 
manifested itself in the emergence of a Zaydi civil society and political groups representing Zaydi 
interests, advocating for the development of the peripheral regions. While this was initially met 
with support by the GoY, the post-reunification economic collapse and civil conflicts did not 
contribute to improving the situation.
17
 Thus, Zaydis nonetheless felt discontent with the social 
and economic policies of the government and the continuous neglect to the periphery, and 
perceived themselves as being specifically discriminated by the government on religious 
grounds.
18
 This Zaydi civil society would later form the basis of the Houthi movement,
19
 
although it is also important to note that not all Houthis are Zaydi or that not all Zaydis are 
Houthis. 
Third, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Yemen sought to 
offer its support in the battle on terrorism. However, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, an influential 
Zaydi cleric one of the leaders of the movement,
20
 denounced the U.S. and Israel, undermining 
the GoY agenda and causing great embarrassment thereto.
21
 This would be insignificant ancillary 
cause, had the GoY not responded to al-Houthi’s call for an armed anti-GoY revolt in 2004 by 
killing al-Houthi in a military operation and thus infuriating the northern tribes to the point of 
them commencing armed insurgency under the Houthi name.
22
 
                                                 
12
 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, “Zaydi Shi’a” 
13
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.3 
14
 Bilal Y. Saab, “Houthi and the Blowback.” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2015-03-29/houthi-and-blowback 
15
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.4 
16
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.5 
17
 Encyclopaedia Britannica,  “Yemen: History.” 
18
 Asher Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.” Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2017-10-16/yemens-humanitarian-nightmare 
19
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, pp.5-6 
20
 Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.” 
21
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.7 
22
 Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.” 
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Finally, the measures employed by the GoY to contain the Houthis are also said to have provoked 
Houthi insurgency, in that it has sent military troops to a historically de facto autonomous 
region,
23
 thus facilitating the perception that the GoY specifically targets Zaydis in its policies.  
It follows that the conflict is primarily caused by historically weak governance of the region 
social and, importantly, religious factors being ancillary causes and a tool for rallying support.
24
 
The local tribes are primarily concerned with everyday matters and standard of living, thus their 
allegiance is determined not by religion, but rather by each conflict party's potential to secure 
those goals and appeal to the tribe leaders.
25
 This is supported by the fact that the Houthis are not 
the only separatist political faction – for example, Al-Hirak, a movement for the independence of 
South Yemen, also enjoys a significant following.
26
  
Furthermore, it is widely alleged that the Houthis are supported by Iran – a Shi’a theocracy 
aiming to gain influence by supporting non-state, particularly Shi’a groups throughout the region 
and destabilizing states it seeks to influence, like Lebanon, or significantly undermine, like Iran’s 
main regional rival Saudi Arabia and the arch-enemy Israel.
27
 Indeed, e.g., the ballistic missiles 
launched at Saudi Arabia’s Capital – Riyadh – are allegedly of Iranian origin.28 Thus, the conflict 
may have also been significantly facilitated by the geopolitical interests of other states – an 
argument supported by the willingness of Saudi Arabia to lead the intervention. Nonetheless, the 
key issue remains the struggle for national power and domestic dominance.
29
 
1.2. Events leading up to the Saudi Arabian-led intervention (2004-2015) 
The spark, 2004: As mentioned prior, the death of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi in 2004 not 
only gave the Houthi movement its name, but also inspired al-Houthi’s followers to take up arms 
in resistance against the GoY, in response to al-Houthi’s prior calls for an uprising. This is said to 
mark the beginning of the Houthi-GoY conflict.
30
 From this point until the Arab Spring, both 
sides engaged in sporadic armed confrontations confined to the Saada Governorate (located in the 
very north of Yemen, bordering Saudi Arabia),
31
 neither side achieving significant victories.
32
 In 
                                                 
23
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.2 
24
 Ayisha Amr, “Houthis, Divided.” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-09-18/houthis-divided 
25
 Charles Schmitz, “In Cahoots With the Houthis.” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-04-19/cahoots-houthis 
26
 Orkaby, “Houthi Who?” 
27
 It must, however, be noted that while Zaydism is a branch of Shi’a Islam, it significantly diverges from the 
Twelver Shi’a Islam characteristic to Iran and its theocratic government.  
David Rothkopf, “Is a Nuclear Iran a Threat or a Distraction?”, Foreign Policy, March 24, 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/24/is-a-nuclear-iran-a-threat-or-a-distraction 
28
 “Saudi says it shot down Houthi missiles over Riyadh and southern cities,” Reuters, April 11, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-airspace/braced-for-air-strikes-on-syria-some-airlines-re-
route-flights-idUSKBN1HI01E. Also “Yemen's Houthi rebels fire ballistic missile at Saudi capital,” Al-Jazeera, 
April 11, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/yemen-houthi-rebels-fire-ballistic-missile-saudi-capital-
180411153418562.html 
29
 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2015,” , p.167 
30
 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2015,” , p.167 
31
 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, p.1 
32
 Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.” 
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2007, Qatar mediated a peace deal, albeit it was soon broken.
33
 As the legitimacy of the GoY 
gradually decreased among the population, Yemen saw rise to extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda 
vying for popular support as well.
34
 
The Arab Spring, 2011: Citizen revolts throughout the Arab world inspired months-long general 
mass protests in Yemen as well, which aimed at ousting president Ali Abdullah Saleh and pushed 
the country closer to a civil war. Formally supported by the GCC, the UN intervened and 
successfully handed the power over to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, intending him as an interim 
leader tasked with bridging the gap between the faction elites and transforming Yemen into a 
stable, sustainable regime,
35
 to no avail.  
The National Dialogue Conference, 2013-2014: Despite Hadi proving to be unable to deliver 
physical or economic stability to Yemen or rally nation-wide support,
36
 the GoY nonetheless 
began dialogue with some of the opposition groups, eventually proposing a new constitution and 
division of Yemen into six federal provinces.
37
 However, the Houthis continued to lead mass 
anti-government protests,
38
 rejecting the proposal from the beginning, claiming it would only 
further limit the power of the northern tribes.
39
  While the GoY was distracted with negotiations, 
the Houthis proceeded to extend their control over larger and larger territories,
40
 eventually 
overtaking Sanaa in September 2014. (See Annex II)
41
 
The Intervention, 2015: Early 2015 saw the dissolution of the interim parliament, Hadi’s 
resignation and subsequent revocation of the resignation,
42
 and the establishment of a Houthi 
revolutionary committee and a transitional government.
43
 On March 24, Hadi asked the UNSC to 
authorize "willing countries that wish to help Yemen to provide immediate support for the 
legitimate authority by all means and measures to protect Yemen and deter the Houthi 
aggression" and notified them that such a request on the basis of Art.51 of the UN Charter has 
been made to the GCC and AL states.
44
 The letter did not receive immediate UNSC response.
45
  
                                                 
33
 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, “Zaydi Shi’a” 
34
 Farea Al-Muslimi, “The Gulf’s Failure in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-06/gulfs-failure-yemen  
35
Al-Muslimi, “The Gulf’s Failure in Yemen”  
36
Al-Muslimi, “The Gulf’s Failure in Yemen”  
37
 European Council on Foreign Relations, “Mapping the Yemen Conflict”. Available on: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen, Accessed March 1, 2018.  See also Ginny Hill, Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi 
Adventurism and the Future of Arabia (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.263-265. 
38
 Amr, “Houthis, Divided.” 
39
 Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.”; Hill, Yemen Endures p.264. 
40
 Al-Muslimi, “The Gulf’s Failure in Yemen” 
41
 Amr, “Houthis, Divided.” 
42
 “Yemen’s Ousted President Withdraws Resignation,” Al-Jazeera, February 24, 2015, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/yemen-abd-rabbu-masnour-hadi-150224001628332.html  
43
 Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare.” 
44
  “Identical letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council” S/2015/217 (26 March 2015), 
Available on: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_217.pdf    
45
 United Nations Security Council, “Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 2014.” 
Available on: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml, Accessed April 15, 2018.   
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Nonetheless, on March 26, Saudi Arabia launched an air campaign, a naval blockade, and the 
deployment of ground troops
46
 supported by Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (hereinafter the Coalition), believing that limited 
military action will be sufficient to eliminate Houthis' most significant offensive capabilities and 
restore the elected Hadi government.
47
 However, this measure was not preceded by any 
expression of support by the UNSC, formal or informal, nor did the SC even comment on the 
intervention in its Resolution 2216 (April 14, 2015), in which it simply condemned the violence, 
sanctioned select Houthi rebels, urged negotiations and transition processes, and called on UN 
Members to enforce the arms embargo on Houthis.
48
   
Thus, the intervention was not commenced under authorization by the UNSC, which displayed an 
abnormally passive stance despite its own recognition of the Yemeni conflict as a threat to 
international peace and security and attempts to facilitate peace talks.
49
 This raises the question 
whether the Saudi-led intervention is legal on the basis of invitation and/or the Art.51 right to 
self-defense for Yemen. 
1.3. Conclusion 
The aim of this introductory chapter was to highlight the key events leading up to the Saudi-led 
intervention and to place the conflict in a wider context by briefly explaining its root causes. 
Three key points must be reiterated. First, the cause of the conflict is not only sectarian divisions, 
as is the conventional surface-level explanation, but rather the decades-long neglect by the ruling 
authorities, weak central governance, and the development of a common Zaydi identity. Second, 
while the violent clashes between the GoY and the Houthis date back to 2004, the escalation of 
violence corresponds to the Arab Spring in 2011, with the Houthis successfully taking advantage 
of the transitional period and the power vacuum by capturing most of North Yemen, including 
Sanaa, in 2014. Third, President Hadi’s request for a UNSC-authorized Coalition of the Willing 
was met with instant involvement by Saudi Arabia and other members of the GCC and/or the AL, 
despite the lack of prior authorization by the UNSC, which failed to comment on Hadi’s request 
in any of the following resolutions on Yemen.  
Therefrom arises the legal issue examined by this thesis – is an IBI legal under international law 
and if the established criteria for IBI have not been met in this or other potential cases, can the 
right to collective self-defense for the inviting state be invoked instead? 
CHAPTER II: CRITERIA FOR A LAWFUL MILITARY INTERVENTION 
2.1. Preliminary considerations 
2.1.1. Principles for interpretation of the UN Charter 
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The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
50
 in its Art.31 clearly prioritizes a 
grammatical interpretation of the Charter ("ordinary meaning [of] the terms of the treaty"). It also 
points towards an interpretation of the relevant Charter provisions “in the light of [the] object and 
purpose” of the Charter as a whole,51 supplemented by preparatory works and the historic context 
of the Charter, envisaged in Art.32.
52
 Subsequent state practice may also be considered as 
interpretative as long as it can be said to establish an agreement among the parties.
53
 
However, two issues complicate the use of treaty purposes as interpretive guidelines. First, the 
purpose-based interpretation cannot entirely override the specific provisions, even if extending or 
restricting the application of a legal rule in a given case would serve the purpose of the treaty 
itself or save the case from a practically inefficient legal solution.
54
 Second, most treaties, 
particularly such as the Charter, which embody a wide variety of international law customs and 
principles, have numerous different objects it pursues, without always clearly indicating the 
prevalence of one aim over another, or even clarifying the meaning of the aim.
55
 Nonetheless, the 
object and purpose of a treaty can be a crucial determining factor in cases where, either due to 
ambiguous or conflicting rules or inconclusive facts, an answer cannot be found through 
grammatical interpretation only.  
Furthermore, conflicts involving the regular forces of State A and a non-state actor in State B are 
one of the key characteristics of the contemporary conflict evolution.
56
 Thus, there is also merit 
in studying state practice as a final factor guiding the interpretation of ambiguous rules according 
to contemporary challenges. Such practice may be the foundation for emerging customary norms 
or, at least, constitute “subsequent practice” for the purposes of Art.31(3) VCLT.57 As such, the 
thesis will proceed to establish the general principles and purposes of the Charter, found in its 
Preamble and Art.1, that are to guide the interpretation of the Charter provisions relevant to this 
case. Subsequent practice, on the other hand, will be addressed during the in-depth discussion of 
the specific elements of the relevant articles. 
First, the Preamble of the Charter clearly states its ultimate goal - “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war”, resolving to maintain international peace and security and ensure that 
armed force is not used if it does not serve the common interest.
58
 Therefrom two observations 
can already be drawn – (1) given that the title of the treaty is Charter of the United Nations, it is 
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intended to have a more constitutional character, thus rising war prevention and the maintenance 
of peace and security to the status of  “the purpose of all purposes”;59 (2) not all use of armed 
force is unlawful, as there may be instances whereby the use of armed force may actually serve 
the common interests of the international community. If this second observation were to be taken 
at a face value, states would be constrained by ceaseless debates on what the common interest 
entails. Thus, it is rightly accepted among states that the Preamble does not create any legal 
obligations on the UN members, but merely emphasizes that the provisions are to be interpreted 
with the war-prevention objective in mind. Consequently, the Preamble is not invoked in 
practice,
60
 stipulating a closer look at Art.1 of the Charter. 
In Art.1(1), the drafters expand on the maintenance of international peace and security principle 
by resolving to collectively act to remove threats and breaches of peace and to prevent 
aggression.
61
 In other words, maintenance of peace is understood not only as efforts to prevent 
conflict, but also as positive action to stabilize the international system, remove the causes of 
conflict,
62
 and prevent threats to peace, among which already the 1986 Proclamation of the 
International Year of Peace includes internal conflicts and civil wars.
63
  
Interestingly, Art.1(2) also mentions the right to self-determination of peoples, a jus cogens 
norm, as a principle for the development of “friendly relations among nations”. As this principle 
might also apply to the Houthi rebels, the aim to limit the use of force, read in conjunction with 
the self-determination rights, might also protect them from external attacks as the Houthis 
establish their own governance structures. Indeed, the Charter does not aim at strictly preserving 
an international status quo, as that may hinder “healthy development[s]”.64 Nonetheless, even if 
the Houthis can be considered benefactors of the right to self-determination, it appears that the 
international peace and security concerns as “the purpose of all purposes” may trump this right, 
unless it is established that the self-determination of the Houthis would, in fact, serve that 
purpose better than the restoration of the interim government. 
In short, if the legal assessment based on grammatical interpretation is inconclusive or vague, the 
purpose-based approach will favor the solution that is better suited for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, be it preserving or changing the status quo. If state practice 
appears to be widespread and uncontested to the point of seemingly constituting a tacit agreement 
among most of states, it will also be considered.  
2.1.2. The General Prohibition on the use of force 
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Prohibition on the threat or use of force, enshrined in Art.2(4) of the Charter
65
 is undoubtedly the 
foundation of the contemporary legal order, consistently referenced in a wide variety of  sources 
of international law and accepted as a jus cogens norm.
66
 As such, the prohibition itself is not 
subject to debate, but rather its limitations and applicability of exceptions. Regarding the 
limitations it is argued that an IBI falls outside the scope of the General Prohibition.
67
 Regarding 
the exceptions, a quick survey of the Charter leads to the conclusion that the only express 
exceptions to the prohibition are (1) action against a former enemy state,
68
 which is clearly 
irrelevant to this thesis, (2) military action on the basis of UNSC authorization, which also is not 
applicable to the case at hand,
69
 and (3) the Art.51 right to self-defense – the only potentially 
applicable exception in this case, as also invoked by the GoY in its request for an intervention. 
Consequently, the thesis will examine two potential legal justifications for an IBI lacking UNSC 
authorization – first, the inapplicability of Art.2(4) due to a valid invitation to intervene, and 
second, the applicability of the Art.51 right to collective self-defense for the inviting state. 
2.2. Intervention by invitation - beyond the scope of Article 2(4) 
2.2.1. Scope of Article 2(4) 
Entities bound and protected by the General Prohibition 
Art. 2(4) explicitly states that it binds all of its members to comply with the prohibition to use 
force. Interestingly, the scope of the protection granted by Art. 2(4) appears wider, as “any state” 
is protected against violations of the prohibition. If understood strictly on the basis of this 
wording, the article could mean that hypothetically any state not a member of the UN – such as a 
de facto regime not yet legally recognized as a state – would be entitled to the rights provided by 
the prohibition without incurring any of the relevant obligations. The discrepancy is resolved by 
state practice and commonly shared interpretation which accepts that both the rights and the 
obligations enshrined in Art. 2(4) apply to de facto states as long as they constitute a “stabilized 
authority”70 – a view well in line with customary law and, indeed, the jus cogens status of the 
article.  
Importantly, if de facto regimes do benefit from Art. 2(4) protection, the Houthis might be 
protected as well, as they have established their own government in the territories under their 
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control. While this observation does not seem to be featured in academic discussion of use of 
force against non-state actors, a brief discussion of the case at hand based on the 1933 
Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood -  permanent population, defined territorial 
boundaries, a government, and an ability to enter into agreements with other states
71
 - might 
nonetheless highlight some issues complicating the application of the IBI doctrine and warranting 
further academic research. 
On the other hand, the entities excluded from the scope of the prohibition are international 
organizations and private individuals and groups, unless they commit an armed attack attributable 
to a state other than the one affected by the attack.
72
 In short, internationally recognized states 
and also de facto states are both protected by the prohibition and bound to comply with it, the 
latter obligation extending to private individuals committing armed attacks attributable to a state. 
“Force” 
The term “force” for the purposes of Art. 2(4) does not cover all kinds of force, but is prevalently 
understood as only referring to “armed force”, excluding, e.g, political or economic force.73 This 
is confirmed by both the drafting history and a purpose-based interpretation of the article, arguing 
that if states were deprived of other forms of force, they would lose their ability to pressure other 
states to comply with the international law.
74
 Furthermore, state practice also dismisses any 
interpretation that construes the Art. 2(4) term “force” more broadly than, e.g., the Art.51 term 
“armed attack”, despite attempts by smaller powers during the Cold War to achieve the 
contrary.
75
 
Alternatively, some interpretations of “force” propose the assessment of the purpose and the 
effect of the use of force, concluding that coercive armed force is prohibited by the Charter. 
However, this interpretation does not establish a clear line between lawful and unlawful coercion, 
which is of utmost importance considering the widespread use of coercive tactics by states in 
their day-to-day dealings.
76
 Finally, another understanding interprets “force” from the perspective 
of protecting states’ rights to freedom from interference,77 although this aspect is already 
enshrined in the principle of non-intervention and does not directly ensure the prevention of 
interstate conflict. Therefore, because even the recent discussions on reinterpretation of the use of 
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force and self-defense doctrines, e.g., in the context of cyber warfare, use the destructiveness of 
military attacks as a point of reference for interpretation by analogy,
78
 it can be concluded that 
Art.2(4) prohibits the threat or use of armed force. 
If the prohibition is limited to “armed force”, then within those limits it needs to be interpreted 
broadly to further the purposes of the Charter. This has twofold implications. First, a broad 
interpretation stipulates that there is no minimum threshold of geographic scope or gravity for 
Art.2(4) to apply, as long as there is an actual armed confrontation between two states.
79
 Second,  
Art.2(4)  ought to apply both to direct use (i.e. entering of regular military forces into the territory 
of another state or cross-border attacks thereto)
80
 and to indirect use, i.e. the involvement of one 
state in the use of force of another state or a non-state military body. Indeed, as states often 
choose to destabilize or even topple enemy governments in pursuit of their interests, support for 
anti-government groups in the target state is much more resource-efficient than the deployment 
of ground troops,
81
 yet the purpose of the act remains equally inconsistent with Art.2(4). In short, 
the key point is that Art.2(4) prohibits direct or indirect threat or use of armed force. 
Other terms 
Art. 2(4) prohibits the use of force “in international relations” “against the territorial integrity and 
the political independence” of a state or the use of force “in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the UN”.82 These terms require further clarification.  
First, “international relations” requirement means that, in line with the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention, use of force exclusively within the borders of a state is not 
covered by the prohibition.
83
 Importantly, for the purposes of Art.2(4), external intervention 
automatically renders the conflict international.
84
 Second, the purpose of including the “territorial 
integrity” principle in Art. 2(4) is not to limit its application, but rather to ensure that any possible 
form of cross-border use of armed force is covered by the article, even if the incursion is not 
intended to gain control over a part of another state’s territory. Thus, “territorial integrity” ought 
to be understood more as “territorial inviolability” and prohibition of “forcible trespassing”.85 
Third, the “purposes of the UN” are an umbrella term for potential gap-filling,86 whereby it could 
be argued that military action causing a large-scale humanitarian crisis might be prohibited under 
this term.  
Most importantly, however, it is argued that because of the terms discussed above, IBI, defined 
as “direct military assistance by the sending of armed forces by one state to another state upon 
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the latter’s request”,87 remains outside the grasp of Art.2(4).88 Indeed, assuming that the 
intervening states comply with the scope of the territorial state’s authorization to intervene, such 
use of force would not affect the territorial integrity or political independence of the territorial 
state.
89
 Nor would it be coercion or “forcible trespassing”, as under the sovereignty principle the 
territorial state is free to use its territory however it wishes, including to authorize foreign 
military operations,
90
 subject to IHL norms. With this argument in mind, the thesis will now 
outline the lawfulness criteria for such interventions, as derived from recent legal scholarship and 
state practice. 
2.2.2. Criteria for a legitimate IBI 
Naturally, the invitation to intervene needs to be valid for it to fall outside the scope of the 
prohibition and meet three cumulative legality criteria explained below.
91
  
Legitimate representative authority 
The capacity to request an intervention originates primarily from the domestic authority of the 
government.
92
 However, this is not to suggest a popular legitimacy requirement, as it does not 
affect the legitimacy of a government in the eyes of international law.
93
 Otherwise, all non-
democratic governments would automatically be illegitimate – a view grossly incompatible with 
current realities. Instead, to have the legal capacity to freely dispose of its territory and authorize 
foreign intervention, the requesting government needs to have international legitimacy, i.e. 
international de jure recognition of the government.
94
 It may be tempting to require that the 
inviting government also has at least a minimum degree of effective control – acceptance or 
acquiescence by the local population of the government’s right to exercise authority and 
represent the state.
95
 Indeed, “failed state” governments are generally not seen as having the 
necessary consent power,
96
 and, e.g., during the anarchy in Somalia in 1990s, the UN Secretary 
General held that there was no government that could authorize the use of force on its territory. 
Thus, at least some minimum degree of effective control of a “sufficiently representative” portion 
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of territory is necessary.
97
 This view appears fairly popular among legal scholars, though lacks a 
consensus on how the degree of governmental control is to be assessed.
98
 
However, the lack of effective control arguably does not alter the legitimate status of the 
government under international law,
99
 as shown by the coups d’état in Haiti and Sierra Leone in 
1990s when the legality of the invitations to intervene issued by the ousted governments was not 
contested.
100
 Therefrom one can conclude that the international law favors the de jure 
government, presuming it to be the representative authority with the right to military assistance
101
 
even if it has lost a significant portion of its territory for an extended period of time. An 
alternative view argues that the effective control doctrine ought to be reinterpreted as the ability 
to effectively protect civilians. Thus, governments installed through international mediation 
processes also generally enjoy a presumption in their favour regardless of the control they 
exercise in practice, as they are best suited to protect civilians in the long-run.
102
 
Nonetheless, it is also argued that even if there is a presumption in favour of the de jure or the 
internationally-installed government, the government must assert its authority over the state 
territory,
103
 and that the authority to request an intervention depends on the continued recognition 
of the requesting government by the international community.
104
  This shows that the effective 
control requirement remains a highly controversial issue, as even those arguing for a presumption 
in favor of the de jure government recognize the need for additional criteria, while the proponents 
of the minimum effective control requirement remain silent on the specific threshold thereof. 
To reconcile the debate, for the purposes of this thesis the main requirement for the capacity to 
request an intervention is the international recognition of the requesting government, as 
international law maintains a rebuttable presumption of “continued effective control”105 in favor 
of the de jure authorities of the state. Evidence of such control will be used to strengthen the 
argument, while evidence of lack of any control will add a strong caveat to the conclusions. 
Formal requirements 
While there is considerable debate on the formal requirements for an invitation to intervene, the 
2011 Resolution on Military Assistance on Request by the Institut de Droit International argues, 
in line with the ICJ judgment in Armed Activities, that the sole formal requirements are that the 
invitation is valid and specific and complies with the international obligations of the inviting 
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state.
106
 Validity of an invitation depends on multiple criteria. First, somewhat overlapping with 
the requirements for the capacity to request an intervention, the invitation must be issued by the 
highest authority of the state without coercion of the officials,
107
 so that it is “internationally 
attributable to a state”.108 Second, the invitation must precede the actual intervention.109 Third, to 
avoid potential abuse, the invitation must be clear and specific enough to indicate the scope or the 
purpose of authorization. This implies also that the intervention must be authorized on an ad hoc 
basis,
110
 even if there is a collective security treaty between the requesting and the intervening 
state.  
Legitimate purpose 
As a recent development in international law, IBIs pose a significant theoretical dilemma for 
legal professionals due to the conflicting legal principles it entails. On the one hand, there is an 
argument that if consent is issued by the legitimate authority, the sovereignty principle gives it 
full rights to request an intervention. On the other hand, because human rights law is said to 
prohibit the internal use of force in absence of an armed conflict, the legality of an IBI may 
require an internal armed conflict context as an objective justification for the derogations.
111
  
Interestingly, however, it is argued that states have no general right to intervene in a civil war in 
favor of the established government
112
 as that might contradict the principle that in an internal 
armed conflict no faction truly represents the state
113
 or the principle of self-determination of 
peoples and their right to choose their own government freely from international interference.
114
 
Therefore, according to this argument, a legitimate aim must be pursued, such as 
counterterrorism
115
 or counter-intervention.
116
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State practice appears to support the latter view. Indeed, e.g., Russia’s statements on its 
involvement in Syria (at the request of the internationally recognized president Bashar al-Assad) 
stress the counter-terrorism objective of the military activities. Similarly, the interventions 
against Da’esh have also been justified with claims of Da’esh being a terrorist organization.117 
On the flip side, a general right to intervene in a civil conflict has been strongly criticized, with 
states in practice not daring to assert such a right.
118
 However, while state practice clearly 
establishes a requirement of a legitimate aim, if not specifically a counter-terrorism aim, this 
clarity creates further confusion, as there is no definition neither of what constitutes a legitimate 
aim, nor of terrorism.  
The definition of terrorism in particular appears to be an impossible feat due to the subjective 
political characteristics of terrorist acts. Legislators have attempted to circumvent the controversy 
by simply outlawing certain acts often employed by terrorists, such as hijacking of planes (1970 
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) or hostage taking (1983 
International Convention Against Taking Hostages) without specifying who the perpetrator must 
be
119
 for the purposes of applying the relevant legal instrument.
120
 However, applying such 
conventions to specific acts carried out by the Houthi rebels would not directly indicate whether 
they can be considered terrorists, nor would it be a sufficiently clear, comprehensive, and 
efficient basis for that determination. Furthermore, such conventions are primarily aimed at 
establishing legal obligations for the signatory states to prevent and prosecute terrorism.
121
 1999 
UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is, however, 
helpful in the sense that in outlining its scope of application, it not only refers to several treaties 
outlawing specific acts, but also contains a forward-looking umbrella provision that includes any 
action that in the context of an armed conflict is aimed at causing death or serious injury to any 
person not taking part in hostilities for the purpose of intimidating the population or compel a 
government or an international organization to act or refrain to act in a particular way.
122
 
While this formulation is not recognized as a universal legal definition of terrorism, it may serve 
as a guideline for assessing whether an act can potentially constitute “terrorism”. Some additional 
guidance on the matter might be found in the UN resolutions and official terrorist lists of 
different governments. While such determination is based on subjective political considerations, 
it appears to be the most feasible method for determining whether the Houthis constitute a 
terrorist organization for the purposes of the emerging legitimate purpose requirement. 
2.2.3. Conclusion: criteria for a lawful IBI 
The following scheme can be derived from the discussion above: 
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Art.2(4) applies to interventions by invitation when: 
1. a) a state, b) a de facto regime, or c) a private entity attributable to a state 
2. uses armed force, directly or indirectly 
3. in a non-internal context  
4. against a) a state, or b) a de facto regime  
5. unless the intervention is commenced on the basis of a valid invitation. 
An invitation to intervene is valid when: 
1. an internationally-recognized government (especially if it exercises effective control 
over the territory) not subject to coercion 
2. issues a clear and specific ad hoc invitation to intervene before the use of force 
3. to pursue a legitimate aim in the context of an internal armed conflict. 
However, should the case study find that the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is not lawful on the 
grounds of the GoY issuing a valid invitation, the lawfulness might nonetheless derive from the 
Art.51 right to collective self-defense for the inviting state. 
2.3. Right to collective self-defense – an overriding exception to Art.2(4) 
In practice, states most frequently justify use of force as an exercise of their “inherent” right to 
self-defense, enshrined in Art.51 of the Charter, as it requires neither prior UNSC authorization, 
nor consent of the territorial state.
123
 The wording of the article suggests that no other provision 
of the Charter may prejudice the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense 
against an armed attack, provided that the state can prove that Art.51 is applicable and subject to 
immediate report to the UNSC the requirement to cease the operation upon UNSC 
intervention.
124
 While the use of the word “inherent” may imply that the right also exists under 
customary law, in the interests of limiting the use of force, the ICJ and state practice confirm that 
Art.51 is the sole regulation on the right to self-defense, and any discussion on the matter must be 
confined to its limits.
125
 Thus, to assess the self-defense justification, the criteria for the 
applicability of Art.51 will be outlined. 
2.3.1. Entities protected by Article 51 
The wording of Art.51 clearly states that any member of the UN is the benefactor of the right to 
self-defense. Given the aim of the case study of this thesis, this fact raises no further questions, as 
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it is Yemen that invokes collective self-defense (according to its letter to the Coalition states)
126
. 
Likewise, it has been established even before the UN era that there is a right to self-defense 
against non-state actors.
127
 However, the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks raised the question of 
whether and to what extent the actions of the non-state actor need to be linked to a state to invoke 
the right to self-defense.  
On the one hand, the traditional restrictive view maintains a state-centric approach, whereby a 
non-state actor must be linked to a state.
128
 If the required link is not to the degree necessary for 
attribution (i.e. non-state actor being sent or effectively or overall controlled by another state or a 
state providing other forms of substantial support like harboring
129
 so that the attack amounts to 
the same gravity as an attack by regular armed forces
130
), then at least the territorial state from 
which the attacks are launched must be “unable” to  fulfill its obligations or “unwilling” 
(responsible for complicity or failure to act)
131
 to suppress the non-state actor activities, in which 
case the ICJ has not excluded the possibility for the right to self-defense to be invoked.
132
 The 
“unable or unwilling” principle constitutes an insufficiently clear doctrine, as it envisages a 
subjective assessment of criteria such as the territorial state’s consent or cooperation in 
suppressing the non-state action or its compliance, its capacity to control the territory, prior 
interactions with the territorial state, nature of the non-state threat etc.,
133
 as well as the question 
of whether there exists an obligation for the state to prevent such attacks in the first place. In 
either case, a state-centric approach is neither stipulated by Art.51, nor does it provide an 
adequate framework to deal with the increasing armed non-state actor threat,
134
 particularly in 
cases of fractured or failed states. This is furthermore highlighted by the inter-state-like elements 
of some recent conflicts, e.g. between Israel and Hezbollah or the international coalition against 
Da’esh, which focus on the broader impact of the conflict, i.e., the result, as opposed to the 
perpetrator.
135
 If the purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, such 
criticism is indeed well-founded. 
On the other hand, recognizing the inadequacy of the state-centric approach, the post-9/11 
prevailing view suggests that there is increasing recognition of right to self-defense even in 
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situations when no clear link between the non-state group and another state can be established.
136
 
The underlying assumption is that the “armed attack” element – the most important requirement 
for Art.51 to apply – is defined as such not by the author of the attack, but rather by its physical 
attributes, as recognized by the separate judicial opinions and declarations on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall case.
137
 It follows that attacks by non-state actors can 
amount to “armed attacks” for the purposes of Art.51, provided that they are of sufficient 
gravity.
138
 Furthermore, UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1371 also address the right to self-defense 
against non-state actors without mentioning any attribution requirements.
139
 Finally, it must be 
stressed that neither legislative sources, nor the ICJ have explicitly excluded exercise of the right 
to self-defense against non-state actors not linked to a state. Such possibility simply has not been 
considered at the time of the drafting of the Charter.
140
 
Nonetheless, it is also argued that despite the evident inefficiency of the state-centric approach 
and despite the state practice, it is still too early to speak of a right to self-defense against a non-
state actor if it is not linked to another state or, if indeed still required, that attribution may arise 
from mere tolerance of the host state of the terrorist presence on its territory.
141
 However, with 
the purposes of the UN to maintain peace and remove threats thereto in mind, the author of this 
thesis favors the focus on the nature, not the author, of the attack as the key requirement for 
invoking Art.51, with a view to ensure greater effectiveness of the right to self-defense. 
2.3.2.  Existence of an “armed attack” 
Undoubtedly, the most important proviso for Art.51 to apply is that self-defense must be 
exercised to repel an “armed attack”. As the Charter contains no definition of an armed attack, it 
is up to judicial decisions and state practice to determine its scope of application, possibly with 
the aim of keeping Art.51 somewhat adaptable to the evolution of warfare.
142
 However, a clear 
definition is yet to be established, complicating the legal assessment of self-defense actions, 
which, as argued prior, rests primarily on the nature of the initial attack, not its perpetrator. 
Instead, the closest the international community has come to a definition of an armed attack is 
possibly the “Definition of Aggression” by the UNGA, listing particular examples: invasion, 
bombardment, cross-border shooting of a scale that exceeds mere border incidents, blockade, and 
attacks on a state’s positions abroad (primarily meaning its military units and provided that the 
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force used on them is not insignificant).
143
 The gravity of the attack must be assessed in light of 
the number of attacks linked together by the same aggressive intent,
144
 however the ICJ in Oil 
Platforms did not exclude that a single attack may be of sufficient gravity as well.
145
 
Furthermore, the gravity of the attack must be such as to warrant the application of international 
law, not merely domestic criminal codes,
146
 though a clear threshold has not been established. 
Alternatively, as recent developments in legal doctrine on self-defense against cyber warfare 
suggest, the “armed” nature of an attack can also be established on the basis of its 
destructiveness.
147
 Finally, there seems to be an implicit requirement that the attack must have 
already taken place, as opposed to being a mere possibility, unless the Caroline criteria for 
anticipatory self-defense are met
148
 (though the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense 
remains controversial). 
Nonetheless, some guiding principles can be inferred. In cases of attacks by non-state actors, 
particularly terrorists, whereby the UNSC explicitly has recognized a right to individual or 
collective self-defense,
149
 (1) self-defense is not necessary if the attack has happened a long time 
ago or has no evident chance of reoccurring;
150
 (2) the response must be of minimum territorial 
infringement consistent with the repellant aim;
151
 and (3) if necessary, self-defense may be 
extended to the entire duration of the terrorist campaign, provided there is not a great delay 
between the initial attack and the response.
152
  
Generally, self-defense does not have to be the last resort after other means of conflict resolution 
have been applied and rendered ineffective,
153
 as it follows from the ICJ judgment in Caroline, a 
case concerning the response to attacks by non-state actors, that it would make no sense to 
impose extra conflict resolution obligations for the victim state before it can defend itself against 
an armed attack that has already occurred, if even preemptive self-defense may be permitted 
under certain conditions. 
2.3.3. Procedural requirements for collective self-defense 
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Finally, Art.51 permits the exercise of both individual and collective self-defense. “Individual” 
self-defense poses no controversy, as the wording itself clearly indicates who is entitled to 
exercise the self-defense right. However, the facts of the case at hand clearly suggest that the 
intervention in Yemen is an example of collective self-defense. This notion demands further 
clarification.  
First, it must be stressed that the “collective” aspect of self-defense authorizes a non-attacked 
state to use force to assist in the defense of an attacked state, in other words, there is no 
requirement for the intervening state to even be affected by the attacking party.
154
 Second, 
collective self-defense may be exercised either on the basis of a treaty, as in the case of the 
NATO collective security mechanism, whereby its application subject to international law is also 
regulated by treaty provisions, or it may be exercised on ad hoc basis. Third, the Nicaragua case 
displayed the risk of abuse by intervening states (the United States) to presume an attack against 
one state (El Salvador) as a sufficient ground to attack another (Nicaragua).
155
 As a result, a 
procedural element was established, whereby the attacked state must first recognize that it has 
been attacked in a way that warrants an Art.51 response. Thus, fourth, the attacked state must 
consent to the use of force on its behalf through a “clear and verifiable” request for assistance.156  
2.3.4. Necessity and proportionality 
Exercise of self-defense in good faith stipulates that it must not be punitive or retaliatory, instead 
only aiming to repel the attack.
157
 This idea is enshrined in two key principles limiting the 
exercise of the right to self-defense – necessity and proportionality – derived not from the 
wording of Art.51, but from subsequent judicial practice and legal doctrine.
158
  
First, necessity indicates whether the action taken by the victim state, including its choice to 
invoke the right to collective self-defense,
159
 is necessary to achieve the goal of self-defense, as 
the principle seeks to avoid conflict escalation and to limit state freedom to act to the 
achievement of a very specific objective.
160
 Thus, one of the effects of the application of the 
necessity criterion is to determine the legitimate target of a self-defense operation.
161
 However, 
this is not to imply that the self-defense action must be identical to the attack, as sometimes more 
force may be necessary to repel the attack than to commit it.
162
 With necessity being a crucial 
requirement for the assessment of legality of self-defense, this poses a significant challenge of 
objective determination. Therefore, each case must be evaluated on an ad hoc basis.  
Second, if a measure is deemed necessary, the principle of proportionality determines the extent 
to which it can be employed and how much force may be used in the pursuit of the legitimate 
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repellent aim.
163
 In practice, however, once necessity is established, the measures taken are 
usually proportionate as well,
164
 given the close link and overlap of the two principles. Not 
surprisingly, the greatest weight in the evaluation of these principles seems to be given to 
necessity. It must be noted that both principles are to be interpreted by the victim states in a 
future, not past-oriented manner,
165
 as a reflection of the repellent aim emphasized before, and 
that the victim states bear the burden of providing sufficient evidence that their actions do, 
indeed, meet all of the criteria outlined so far. 
2.3.5. The role of the UN Security Council 
Procedurally, Art.51 stipulates immediate involvement by the UNSC – first, the defending state 
must immediately report its actions to the UNSC, and second, self-defense actions must cease as 
soon as the UNSC has taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. 
The Charter leaves it unclear whether there is a specific form in which the report must be made or 
if it needs to explicitly invoke Art.51,
166
 even though states themselves usually make sure to 
justify their actions and stress their defensive nature, as the lack of a report of any kind may 
imply that the state itself is not sure whether it acted with the aim of self-defense.
167
 It is likewise 
unclear from the wording what kind of UNSC response constitutes the necessary measures upon 
which the attacked state must cease to act. 
2.3.6. Extraterritorial application – right to self-defense juxtaposed to the rights of 
the host state 
Exercise of the right to self-defense, particularly in the context of armed attacks by non-state 
actors not attributable to their host state, raises the issue of the adequate protection of the rights of 
the territorial state where the self-defense is exercised, e.g. territorial integrity (inviolability) and 
non-intervention, particularly if the territorial state is not a party to the conflict. A potential 
solution is to consider lawful self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, excusing 
any violations of the host state’s rights as long as the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality are met. This solution rests on the view that there can be no “self-defense against 
self-defense”, as any violation of the host state’s rights is incidental effect of the exercise of the 
victim state’s “inherent” right168 that shall not be prejudiced by any other provision of the 
Charter. This is supported by Art.21 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which, however, can be interpreted as establishing that only 
certain non-absolute rights of the host state may be violated.
169
 Moreover, if the host state has, in 
effect, lost control over the part of the territory wherefrom the non-state actor operates, it would 
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appear that no territorial rights would be infringed by the victim state, however international law 
does not provide a distinction between legal and effective sovereignty.
170
 In any case, it seems 
reasonable to take into consideration whether the territorial state itself asserts that its rights have 
been violated for a definite conclusion. 
2.3.7. Conclusion: criteria for the lawful exercise of the right to collective self-
defense 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that: 
A military intervention in another state on the basis of collective self-defense is lawful when: 
1. A UN member state 
2. in response to an armed attack, i.e: 
a. an attack perpetrated by a state or a non-state actor, independent or linked to 
another state, 
b. an attack taking effect in the state territory or against its positions abroad, 
c. an attack of sufficient gravity (not a mere border skirmish) in terms of the scope 
and destructibeness of the force used 
3. determines an Art. 51 situation and issues a clear request for external assistance, 
4. which would employ necessary and proportionate means with the sole aim of 
repelling the attack, 
5. provided that the self-defense actions are immediately reported to the UNSC, and 
ceases to act after the UNSC has taken the necessary measures to maintain 
international peace and security. 
With the formula for the assessment of both legal justifications outlined, the thesis will now 
proceed to a juxtaposition of the facts pertaining to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen to the 
criteria for legality of a military intervention. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: THE LEGALITY OF THE SAUDI-LED INTERVENTION IN YEMEN 
3.1. Intervention by invitation and the inapplicability of the Article 2(4) 
prohibition of the use of force 
3.1.1. Entities bound by Article 2(4). 
As established prior, both fully fledged and de facto states are bound by the Art.2(4) prohibition 
on the use of force. This criterion raises no further doubts, since all of the intervening states - 
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Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, Morocco, 
and Pakistan – are internationally recognized states and members of the UN, and thus clearly 
obliged to comply with the Charter provisions. 
3.1.2. Use of direct or indirect coercive armed force. 
The use of armed force is likewise obvious from the very nature of the Saudi-led intervention. 
Operation “Decisive Storm”, commenced on March 26, 2015, and the subsequent operation 
“Restoring Hope” included the use of significant military capabilities by the intervening states. 
First, a series of naval operations were carried out to establish a full blockade, whereby the 
Yemeni territorial waters were closed for all commercial and military vessels that did not have a 
GoY authorization, and attack land-based targets to prevent arms delivery to the rebels.
171
 
Second, the Coalition commenced an extensive air campaign, which saw “ceaseless” 
bombardment of Houthi targets by ~185 fighter jets
172
 and even the designation of the Saada and 
Marran cities in the Saada governorate (the main Houthi stronghold) as “free-fire zones” to 
coerce the Houthis to surrender. In effect, the city of Saada suffered the most extensive damage 
to civilian infrastructure despite the lack of ground fighting therein.
173
 Finally, ground troops 
were also deployed in Yemen, the Emirati forces even suffering significant casualties.
174
 
However, the main weight was given to the air operations, which established sufficient air 
supremacy of the Coalition forces to end “Decisive Storm” on April 21, 2015, and commence 
operation “Restoring Hope”.175 This clearly shows that the Coalition employed direct coercive 
armed force, as stipulated by Art.2(4). 
3.1.3. Use of force in a non-internal context 
It is likewise evident from the facts of the case that the force used by the Coalition was of cross-
border nature, as the Houthis were targeted in Yemeni territory, and thus it clearly falls under the 
scope of Art.2(4). 
3.1.4. Entities protected by Article 2(4) 
Because the threat or use of force is prohibited against any state, according to Art.2(4) of the 
Charter, one could conclude that also de facto states that do not yet enjoy a UN membership or 
universal recognition might also be protected by the prohibition. While there does not appear to 
be much academic support for this assertion, the Houthis meeting the criteria for statehood might 
raise legal issues for further research to address. 
The Houthi rebels cannot be considered to reach the threshold for any of the Montevideo criteria 
for statehood. First, considering that a permanent population and defined boundaries largely  go 
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hand-in-hand, a simple look at the maps displaying the fluctuations of Houthi control over 
Yemen will suffice to show that only a relatively small territory is under constant and consistent 
Houthi control, the others having varying degrees of influence and presence at best.
176
 Second, 
the Houthis had formed their own interim governance structures after capturing Sana’a in 
September 2014, including the establishment of “popular committees” throughout their 
controlled territories
177
 and were indeed considered to hold the de facto control over military, 
political and economic structures therein,
178
 even including the Yemeni Central Bank.
179
 
However, Houthis have also been considered unable to efficiently govern the territories in the 
long run,
180
 and the Houthi leadership has stressed the movement’s partnership aspirations, as 
opposed to governance and control.
181
 Thus, while there is some merit to concluding that the 
Houthis do show a degree of de facto governance their controlled territories, it is highly debatable 
whether this control is sustainable, given the destruction and economic collapse caused by the 
conflict and the refusal of a number of states to recognize the Houthis as a legitimate authority.
182
 
It follows that, third, the Houthis are not practically capable of entering into binding legal 
agreements with other states just yet.  
In short, the Houthis do not seem to enjoy Art.2(4) protection even if it were to extend to de facto 
state entities. Therefore, the effect the attack has on territorial inviolability, political 
independence, or UN purposes must be viewed from the GoY perspective, and it is the validity of 
an invitation to intervene that will ultimately determine if any of these factors have indeed been 
negatively affected by the intervention. 
 
3.1.5. Legitimate representative authority 
As established prior, the authority of a government to request a military intervention is heavily 
reliant on whether it is recognized and/or supported as the legitimate government by the 
international community. Such recognition not only reflects the decision-making authority under 
international and domestic constitutional law, but also influences the threshold for the “effective 
control” and perhaps even the legitimate purpose requirements assessed below.  
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First, the request was issued by the UN-installed de jure interim leader President Hadi,
183
 
therefore the GoY greatly benefits from the international legitimacy point of view. In addition to 
the Coalition states, whose response to the invitation and establishment of embassies in the 
interim capital Aden clearly indicates their support for Hadi
 184
, the UN itself explicitly confirms 
Hadi as the legitimate leader of Yemen. For example, Resolution 2216 both noted the GoY letters 
requesting intervention and reaffirmed UNSC support for Hadi’s legitimacy, urging all other 
states to respect Hadi’s presidential authority, while also condemning Houthis for breaches of 
prior UNSC resolutions and demanding cessation of Houthi hostilities to give way for peaceful 
transition of power.
185
 Furthermore, according to the UN, it is Hadi who has the exclusive right to 
choose which parties to involve in the peace talks.
186
 Thus, it appears to not matter to the 
international community that Hadi’s domestic support was limited from the outset of his 
leadership,
187
 as significant criticism of the intervening in his support was expressed only by Iran, 
backed by the Iranian-affiliated government of Iraq,
188
 while among the UNSC members, there 
were no explicit doubts about the legality of the intervention.
189
 In short, the widespread 
international support enjoyed by Hadi and the fact that he gained power under UN auspices is 
clearly enough to shift the application of the remaining criteria in his favor. 
Second, while there is considerable debate surrounding the extent of Hadi’s control over Yemen 
at the time of the request, it appears not to meet the requirements even for the presumption of 
continuous effective control. On the one hand, it is argued that despite the loss of Sanaa and the 
adjacent territories to the Houthis, Hadi nonetheless asserted control over most of Yemeni 
territory along with sections of the armed forces and some tribal leaders even in March 2015,
190
 
revoking his resignation on the basis of duress exercised by the Houthis during Hadi’s house 
arrest.
191
 This loss of control could have reasonably been seen as temporary, as there were doubts 
whether Houthis were capable of taking over the entire territory. Thus, it can be argued that an 
intervention could “save Yemen as a state” – such argument was invoked also in the case of Mali 
in 2013.
192
 
On the other hand, despite having been installed by the UN as the interim leader following 
Saleh’s removal from power during the turmoil of the Arab Spring, Hadi is said never to have 
been fully in control of Yemen.
193
 Indeed, e.g. the 2014 Fragile States Index lists Yemen under 
“high alert” states, indicating, inter alia, the lack of stable governance.194 Hadi’s government has 
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been criticized as highly ineffective and dependent on external, not internal legitimacy, with de 
facto governance left up to local tribal leaders that may or may not be loyal to Hadi (the relatively 
stable Mareb governorate, loyal to the official Yemeni prime minister Sultan al-Aradah, being a 
notable example).
195
 This is eerily reminiscent of the weak, decentralized governance of Yemen 
Arab Republic before the unification.  
Furthermore, Hadi’s control over the military appears to be rather nominal, as the “Yemeni 
National Army” is said to comprise of a variety of diverse groups united only by their anti-Houthi 
agenda.
196
 Moreover, a portion of the Yemeni security forces remained loyal to Saleh and, by 
extension, to the Houthis, which many argue is the reason for the successful takeover of Sanaa.
197
 
Finally, it is argued that upon conquering Sanaa, the Houthis installed their own effective 
governance structures, and while before the intervention they occupied less than half of the total 
territory of Yemen, they did effectively control the majority of its population (Compare Annexes 
II and III). Hadi, on the contrary, was forced to leave even Aden, the temporary capital of 
Yemen, and seek refuge in Riyadh,
198
 effectively amounting to exile. Thus, the presumption of 
effective control in favor of the legitimate government may be rebutted in this case, rendering the 
invitation invalid.  
Interestingly, however, the fact that the UNSC acknowledged Hadi’s invitation in Resolution 
Resolution 2216 strongly suggests otherwise, confirming the principle of a presumption in favour 
of a government installed by an international reconciliation process. Furthermore, the previous 
Saudi intervention in Yemen in 2009 was not contested despite the then-GoY losing control over 
territories in Northern Yemen,
199
 and the effective control requirement, especially the 
requirement that the government must not be in exile, finds its authority primarily in legal 
scholarship. Thus, it can be concluded that both previous state practice and the UNSC support for 
Hadi and the acknowledgment of his request for an intervention may trump the legal scholarship 
and confirm Hadi as the legitimate authority capable of authorizing an intervention regardless of 
the actual degree of GoY control over Yemen. 
3.1.6. Formal requirements 
First, there is next to nothing to suggest that Hadi was coerced into requesting the invitation. 
While it is undeniably in Saudi Arabia’s security interests to seek to curtail the Houthi expansion 
in light of, e.g., the 2009 border skirmishes, and Saudi Arabia had, in fact, cut off foreign aid to 
Yemen in response to the developments in Yemen, which it saw as an expression of aggressive 
Iranian foreign policy,
200
 this would be a very indirect coercive measure towards the GoY at best. 
Furthermore, the intervention is clearly in Hadi’s political interests to stay in power (expressed 
by the revocation of his resignation
201
), considering that previous dispute resolution attempts had 
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failed to contain the Houthi rebellion.
202
 Thus, the request cannot be rendered invalid on the basis 
of coercion. 
Second, according to the annexes and enclosures to the March 26, 2015 identical letters 
submitted to the President and the Secretary General of the UNSC by the representatives of 
Bahrein, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, the invitation to intervene 
was issued on March 24, 2015, thus predating the intervention by two days.  
Third, the ad hoc nature of the invitation is reflected by the lengthy discussion of Houthi 
hostilities in the beginning of the letter, followed by a very explicit and specific urge to: 
provide immediate support in every form and take the necessary measures, including 
military intervention [emphasis added], to protect Yemen and its people from the 
ongoing Houthi aggression, repel the attack that is expected at any moment on Aden and 
the other cities of the South, and help Yemen to confront Al-Qaida and Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant.
203
 
However, the “specific” nature of the invitation warrants more scrutiny, as the letter was 
addressed only to five of the ten Coalition states. The text of the invitation also refers to the June 
17, 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab 
League, which establishes a collective security mechanism among all members of the League,
204
 
however this does not explain the Pakistan’s participation in the intervention. Instead, the legality 
of the Pakistani involvement most likely rests on the following formulation in Hadi’s letter: “I 
therefore appeal to you, and to the allied States that you represent [emphasis added], to […] 
come to the country’s aid.”205 This formulation does raise some alarm, as the intervening states 
appear to have a degree of leeway in determining their allies, which might potentially enable 
abuse of the authorization. However, the invitation is very clear regarding its objectives, thus, in 
theory, blocking use of force that does not serve those purposes.  
Therefore, Hadi’s letter to (some of) the Coalition states complies with the formal requirements 
for a valid invitation to intervene, as it most likely was not a result of coercion against Hadi, it 
predates the commencement of “Decisive Storm”, and it is explicit, ad hoc, and sufficiently 
specific regarding its scope and objectives. 
 
 
3.1.7. Legitimate purpose 
The final criterion for the validity of an IBI is the pursuit of a legitimate aim, as both states and 
scholars have rejected the idea of a general right to intervene in civil conflicts. Paradoxically, it is 
the existence of an internal armed conflict that legitimizes the use of armed force by a 
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government against its citizens, thus requiring the intervention to take place in the context of an 
internal armed conflict. 
First, despite the lack of a universal legal definition, the Yemeni conflict is very commonly 
referred to as a “civil war” both by academics206 and by UN officials,207 with “Conflict 
Barometer 2015” classifying it as a high intensity violent conflict/war for national power.208 
These claims are supported by two facts – the Houthis, allied with the ex-president Saleh, sought 
to establish a their own rule under the pretext of creating a “new civil state” and installed their 
own revolutionary committees and governance structures after the capture of Sanaa,
209
 while 
Hadi, after fleeing to Aden from Sanaa, declared Aden the interim capital of Yemen and 
established an alternative government therein.
210
 This shows that the Yemeni conflict is a serious, 
prolonged contest for the governance of the state by multiple sizable factions, and thus appears to 
constitute a civil war, necessitating a legitimate purpose for the intervention. 
Second, two main purposes appear in the rhetoric concerning the intervention. On the one hand, 
the intervention can be said to pursue if not counterterrorism objectives, then at least the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Firstly, even though the Houthis were not 
explicitly called terrorists neither by Hadi, nor by the majority intervening states, the intervening 
states did mention a counterterrorism aim of the intervention as a whole,
211
 and there have been 
reports of Saudi Arabian officials referring to the Houthis as terrorists.
212
 Academics are also 
increasingly referring to the Houthis as representing a new type of terrorist organizations, e.g. 
territorial terrorists
213
 or terrorist semi-states.
214
 Indeed, while the Houthi takeover does not 
appear to be aimed at instilling fear into civilian population, it does aim to coerce the GoY to 
succumb to Houthi demands, according to the aforementioned potential definition of terrorist acts 
by the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Secondly, the intervention 
is widely accepted as countering a threat to the territorial unity of Yemen, the sovereignty of the 
legitimate GoY over the territory, and ultimately international peace and security,
215
 expressed by 
the repeated UNSC condemnation of the Houthis.
216
 This clearly indicates that in the eyes of the 
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international community, the intervention pursues legitimate goals, most criticism only being 
targeted at the conduct of the intervention, not the fact in itself.
217
  
On the other hand, more controversially, the intervention may also pursue a counter-intervention 
aim, as the intervening states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have accused Iran for being the driver of 
the Houthi rebellion.
218
 While Saudi concerns are reasonable given Iran’s foreign policy tactics 
and pro-Houthi rhetoric, Iranian involvement does not have sufficiently strong evidence, as the 
thesis will argue under the self-defense justification. In any case, it is clear from the UN 
statements on Yemen that it recognizes that the intervention formally pursues a legitimate aim. 
3.1.8. Conclusion: inapplicability of Article 2(4) to the Saudi-led intervention in 
Yemen on the basis of a valid invitation by the GoY 
To summarize, the intervention in Yemen is a clear case of cross-border use of force that does not 
constitute an Art.2(4) violation due to the applicability of the IBI doctrine. The invitation was 
issued by the UN-installed de jure GoY in compliance with the formal requirements (clear, 
specific, ad hoc, predating the intervention and not subject to coercion), and the intervention 
pursued a legitimate aim – maintenance of international peace and security and the territorial 
unity and sovereignty of GoY – in the context of an internal armed conflict. Importantly, 
however, this conclusion rests on the assumption that there is no effective control requirement, 
that the GoY benefits from a presumption of effective control, or that the lack of effective control 
is trumped by the subsequent UNSC recognition of the validity of the invitation.  
3.2. Yemen’s right to collective self-defense  
3.2.1. Entities protected by Article 51 
As only UN member states are entitled to the Art.51 right to self-defense and Yemen, along with 
all of the intervening states, is a member of the UN, this criterion raises no further questions. 
3.2.2. Existence of an “armed attack” 
Whether the state exercising the right to self-defense has, in fact, been a victim of an armed 
attack is usually subject to great controversy. However, given that the Art.51-based intervention 
was commenced in response to the Houthis gaining significant portions of the territory,
219
 the 
incidence of an armed attack appears to be easily established, if one assumes that an armed attack 
is defined only based on its nature and gravity, not its perpetrator.
220
 
More specifically, following the Arab Spring while the GoY was engaged in transitional efforts 
and the National Dialogue Conference, armed GoY-Houthi clashes expanded from the Saada 
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Governorate further south and east,
221
 culminating in the capture of the Yemeni capital Sana’a in 
September 2014, placement of the government under house arrest and seizure of control over 
most state institutions.
222
 This fact alone points to an attack of sufficient gravity to amount to an 
“armed” attack for the purposes of Art.51, especially since Houthis enjoyed the assistance of 
Saleh-loyal sections of the Yemeni army and possessed increasingly sophisticated military 
capabilities themselves, including long-range rockets, tanks, and anti-aircraft guns.
223
 
Furthermore, the Houthis did not stop at Sana’a and advanced towards the “temporary capital” 
Aden, while capturing several other sizeable cities on the way.
224
  Finally, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross already on March 26, 2015 assessed that the situation in Yemen 
amounts to an armed conflict and warrants the application of IHL norms, in line with the 
“Conflict Barometer 2015” assessment.225 Clearly, the overall impact of the Houthi offensive 
clearly indicates that they had carried out an armed attack prior to the intervention, the separate 
operations being linked by the same aggressive intent. 
However, even though the theoretical chapter argued for the right to self-defense against non-
state actors regardless of whether they are linked to another state, there are widespread 
allegations of Iranian support of the Houthi rebels that warrant some discussion.  
On the one hand, both GoY and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly accused Iran of orchestrating the 
Houthi rebellion.
226
 Indeed, support for non-state, particularly Shi’a Muslim, actor activity is one 
of the lynchpins of Iranian foreign policy, therefore such accusations are grounded in a rational 
realist understanding of geopolitics. In support of this view, the Houthis are arguably influenced 
by Iranian ideology,
227
 as shown by the previously discussed anti-American and anti-Israel 
rhetoric of al-Houthi, while Iran has welcomed the Houthi advances and expressed its strong 
support, engaging with Houthi leadership as if it were the de facto government.
228
 Furthermore, 
Iran is accused of supplying Houthis with Iranian-made missiles and other equipment, as well as 
training the rebels via its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.
229
 Nonetheless, Iranian officials themselves 
have been ambiguous in this regard, claiming both that they are present in Yemen and that they 
are not.
230
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On the other hand, the proof of Iran’s role in Yemen is considered inconclusive and insufficient 
to establish a direct link between the Islamic Republic and the Houthis. There is evidence only of 
small-scale arms supply and military consultation by Iranian forces,
231
 and the Houthis are said to 
be largely independent both from Iranian arms support and direct Iranian control over Houthi 
decision-making.
232
 Instead, it is argued that in the beginning of the Houthi-Coalition conflict, it 
was Saleh that had most influence over Houthis, not an external actor, with Iran simply taking 
advantage of the opportunity to counter Saudi Arabia in yet another arena.
233
 This would also 
explain the ambiguous reaction to the accusations by the Iranian officials. Finally, despite 
numerous indications of close Houthi-Iranian ties, even the UN Panel of Experts on the Situation 
in Yemen failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a clear link between the two.
234
 
In short, there does not appear to be sufficiently sound evidence to suggest that Houthi actions 
depend on Iranian decision-making even if there are noteworthy indicators. While this would 
invalidate a self-defense justification of the intervention under a strict traditional interpretation of 
Art.51, for reasons explained in Chapter II, this conclusion will not affect the assessment of 
applicability of Art.51 to the case at hand. 
3.2.3. Procedural requirements for collective self-defense 
Collective self-defense imposes two additional procedural requirements for the victim state. First, 
it must determine that it has been the victim of an armed attack and that an Art.51 situation exists, 
and second, it must explicitly invite external assistance. GoY meets these requirements by 
explicitly referring to both Art.51 and the collective security mechanism of the Arab League in its 
request for the Coalition states to intervene.
235
 
3.2.4. Necessity and proportionality 
With Yemen clearly being a victim of an armed attack (gravity-wise), it is certainly entitled to 
exercise its Art.51 rights. However, state practice stipulates limiting the availability of self-
defense actions by the principles of necessity and proportionality. From the perspective of 
necessity, the thesis will focus on the necessity of the international intervention as such, whereas 
the adequacy of the general means of the intervention will be discussed under the proportionality 
criterion. 
First, the international involvement in support of GoY was warranted - the very fact that the 
Houthis were able to seize control over Sana’a and quickly advance to Aden without being 
hindered by the Government forces speaks volumes of the balance of power between the two 
parties. Indeed, the rapid Houthi takeover of some of the largest cities in Yemen enabled them to 
seize significant military assets,
236
 raising alarm that further expansion might lead to a Houthi-
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controlled air and naval force.
237
 Furthermore, Houthis allegedly received some arms support 
from the militarily more advanced Iran already in 2009.
238
 The concerns regarding increased 
Houthi capabilities indeed materialized when the rebels captured Aden in early April 2015 and 
the extensive Saudi-led air campaign did not restore Hadi’s control thereover until July 2017 and 
it even incited the Houthis to carry out cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia.
239
 Moreover, 
the loyalty of some sections of the Yemeni military to ex-president Saleh also left the Hadi-loyal 
(or at least anti-Houthi) part of the Yemeni forces at a serious disadvantage, as they were left in 
significantly smaller numbers and with outdated equipment,
240
 and they generally had a very 
fragmented command structure with shaky allegiance to Hadi.
241
  
As such, there is merit to the Saudi Arabian view that limited military action would, in fact, be 
necessary and capable of neutralizing Houthi offensive capabilities and incite the opposition 
factions to engage in peace talks with Hadi, thus restoring his authority.
242
 Indeed, the Coalition 
eventually managed to seize Aden in July 17, 2015, allowing for the gradual return of the 
legitimate GoY to the interim Capital, even though the actual Capital – Sanaa – remains under 
Houthi control to this day (See Annex V). Therefore, considering that Hadi’s legitimacy at the 
time stemmed primarily from external, not internal recognition as discussed prior, one can safely 
conclude that international action was indeed necessary to repel the Houthi offensive and 
reestablish Hadi’s control over Yemen – the key purposes of the self-defense operation. 
However, the proportionality of the intervention raises some doubts. On the one hand, on the 
surface the intervention did appear to pursue the specific self-defense related objectives by 
adequate means. It enforced an arms embargo by means of the naval and air blockade, thus 
preventing potential Iranian arms supply to the Houthis,
243
 applied a “scorched earth” strategy by 
bombing Yemeni airports and seaports to prevent Houthi acquisition of air and naval 
capabilities,
244
 bombarded of Houthi strongholds in Saada and ground deployment near the Saudi 
border to prevent spillover of the hostilities into Saudi territory,
245
 and generally targeted of 
Houthis throughout the country in its air strikes.
246
  
On the other hand, the Coalition efforts appear grossly inefficient and misapplied. Despite weeks 
of what has been described as “ceaseless” bombardment, the Coalition failed to halt Houthi 
expansion (See Annex IV), let alone achieve any rollback until July 2015
247
 - a surprising 
struggle, considering that the intervention was carried out by nine Coalition states with additional 
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arms and intelligence support from great powers, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom.
248
 Instead, while initially the Coalition targeted Houthi-controlled military bases and 
weapon storage facilities, the Coalition has also repeatedly been accused of causing 
disproportionate and perhaps even intentional destruction of civilian targets, including refugee 
shelters, ~29 hospitals and medical centers, and grocery stores.
249
 Considering that the entire 
cities of Saada and Maran have been named military targets, Saada arguably suffering the 
greatest destruction of civilian infrastructure,
250
 and that already in 2015 human rights watchdogs 
and UN panel of experts pointed out serious violations of IHL by the Coalition,
251
 such 
accusations are not unfounded.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to conclude that while an external intervention in 
Yemen was, indeed, necessary to repel the Houthi expansion and restore Hadi in power and that 
the use of air, naval, and ground capabilities of the Coalition states could theoretically be a 
proportionate response to the extent of the armed attack suffered by GoY, the Coalition’s military 
efforts were clearly misapplied already in the first months of the intervention, causing egregious 
civilian suffering while failing to achieve significant results. This issue undoubtedly warrants a 
separate analysis under IHL.  
3.2.5. The role of the UN Security Council  
Regarding the UNSC, states invoking the right to self-defense only have two obligations – to 
immediately report the actions taken in self-defense and to cease the action as soon as the UNSC 
has taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. The Yemen case 
appears to meet both. 
First, upon the launch of the intervention, representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrein submitted a joint statement to the UNSC notifying the 
Council of the military operation and clearly stating its reasons and justification, enclosing Hadi’s 
letter which explicitly invoked the Art.51 right to collective self-defense.
252
 Art.51 does not 
stipulate that a particular actor is obliged to submit the report of the self-defense actions. 
Furthermore, similarly to the UNSC tacit acceptance of the validity of Hadi’s invitation to 
intervene, the UNSC likewise has not commented in any of the following resolutions that this 
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requirement has not been complied with.
253
 Thus, the duty to report the self-defense measures has 
clearly been fulfilled. 
Second, while it remains unclear how to determine if the UNSC has taken the necessary steps to 
maintain international peace and security, the facts of the case clearly show that whatever action 
the UNSC has taken has not achieved a de-escalation of hostilities. On the one hand, the UNSC 
did issue its April 2015 Resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, enabling itself to also 
employ military force, if necessary.
254
 The Resolution also urges the parties to the conflict to 
participate in UN-led peace talks and continue the transitional process within the framework of a 
National Dialogue conference,
255
 as envisaged already in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. On 
the other hand, the three rounds of UN-organized peace talks have all failed to achieve lasting 
results,
256
 with all of the agreed truces eventually broken.
257
 The alleged reason for the failure of 
the negotiations is the binary approach, primarily juxtaposing the Houthis and the GoY and 
overlooking the increasing role of other factions in Yemen, particularly separatists in the South, 
which are not yet motivated to facilitate the peace process, and the interests of external actors, 
particularly Saudi Arabia.
258
 The UNSC has also attempted to impose an arms embargo, which is 
in practice enforced by the intervening states,
259
 yet still has not prevented the Houthis from 
using missiles of Iranian origin. Finally, the Houthi leadership has been subject to asset freezes 
and travel bans, which have practically had no effect, as the financial dealings take place in cash 
and the Houthi leaders have not attempted to leave Yemen.
260
 Therefore, it seems fair to conclude 
that the UNSC has not taken the necessary action to maintain international peace and security, at 
least not effectively. Thus, the Saudi-led intervention cannot be delegitimized on this ground. 
3.2.6. Conclusion: applicability of the Article 51 right to collective self-defense 
In short, the intervention in Yemen appears to comply with the Art.51 criteria for invoking the 
right to collective self-defense. The Houthi takeover of a large portion of Yemen clearly amounts 
to an armed attack that, due to Houthi military capabilities in relation to those of GoY, 
necessitates an international intervention by deployment of air, naval, and ground forces, which 
could theoretically be adequate to the Houthi threat and the objectives of the self-defense 
operation. The procedural requirements both relating to collective self-defense specifically and 
the role of the UNSC have also been fulfilled, and the actions taken by the UNSC so far do not 
appear to amount to the measures for maintenance of international peace and security upon which 
the exercise of self-defense would be required to cease. However, the widespread targeting of 
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civilian structures by the Coalition forces renders the compatibility of the intervention with the 
proportionality requirement highly debatable, and even if this would not invalidate the 
intervention under Art.51, the application of IHL norms is clearly a relevant task for further 
research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
With ever-increasing civilian suffering and no resolution in sight, the ongoing conflict in Yemen 
has evolved from an issue of domestic misgovernance to another battlefield for regional powers 
vying for influence. What started out as a movement against political and economic 
marginalization of the periphery took on a sectarian character with Yemen’s Zaydi Muslims 
increasingly feeling targeted by the policies of GoY and eventually, after consolidating under the 
al-Houthi leadership, engaged in armed clashes against the Government in early 2000s. The Arab 
Spring unrest and the subsequent domestic instability in Yemen proved to be an opportunity for 
the Houthi rebels to extend their control, resulting in the Houthis capturing Sana’a and the GoY 
requesting other states to intervene on its behalf on the basis of the right to collective self-
defense.  
Therefrom arose the legal issue examined by this thesis: whether the Saudi Arabian-led military 
intervention in Yemen complies with the principle of jus ad bellum, as enshrined by the UN 
Charter. The thesis examined two possible legal justifications – (1) the inapplicability of the 
Art.2(4) general prohibition on the use of force due to the intervention being commenced upon a 
valid invitation and (2) Yemen’s Art.51 right to collective self-defense. 
Art.2(4) is not applicable when an intervention follows a valid invitation – a specific, clear, and 
ad hoc invitation issued by the legitimate authority of the state not subject to duress – and takes 
place in the context of an internal armed conflict. Furthermore, the intervention must also pursue 
a legitimate aim. The intervention in the civil war in Yemen meets all of these criteria, given the 
timing and the nature of the invitation, the recognition of the international community of Hadi as 
the legitimate leader of Yemen, and the recognition by GoY, the intervening states, and the 
international community at large of Houthis as a threat to Yemen’s unity and international peace 
and security. However, this conclusion is only valid insofar as the UNSC tacit acknowledgment 
of the validity of Hadi’s request trumps any requirements of (presumed) effective control that the 
GoY may be required meet to be considered the representative authority of Yemen. 
Art.51 right to collective self-defense is triggered by one key criterion –an armed attack against 
the victim state. While the specific requirements are subject to continuous debate, the thesis 
argues that the existence of an armed attack is determined by the gravity of the attack, and not its 
perpetrator – it can originate both from a state and a non-state actor, and the latter need not be 
linked to a state. In his request to the Coalition states, later forwarded to the UNSC as a 
notification of the intervention in Yemen, Hadi explicitly invoked Art.51. Indeed, the Houthi 
advances did amount to an armed attack, that, in line with the principle of necessity, warranted 
external military intervention. However, the proportionality requirement significantly undermines 
the application of Art.51 to the intervention, as the Coalition efforts were grossly misapplied, 
resulting in excessive and perhaps even purposeful harm to the civilian population, while failing 
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to achieve the collective self-defense objectives despite the sizeable military capabilities of the 
Coalition.  
Therefore, to answer the research question of the thesis, the Saudi-led military intervention in 
Yemen is legal, because its compliance with the criteria for a valid IBI renders Art.2(4) 
inapplicable in this case. However, the applicability of Art.51 is questionable at best, given the 
misapplication of Coalition efforts and the subsequent excessive civilian suffering. Even if this 
fact does not invalidate the intervention as such, there is clearly ample ground for further scrutiny 
under international humanitarian law. A just cause does not equal a just war.  
The outlook for Yemen remains grim. Already the failed National Dialogue Conference clearly 
showed the complexity of the conflict between the GoY and the local factions, whereby not all 
sides were interested in a peaceful solution and terrorist groups could flourish. The Saudi-led 
intervention added regional geopolitical interests to the mix, transforming Yemen into a 
battleground for yet another Saudi-Iranian standoff and further escalating the hostilities. While 
Aden has been partially retaken by GoY-loyal forces (See Annex V), the Houthis are now firing 
missiles even at the Saudi capital in retaliation for the intervention. The UN-supported peace 
initiatives do not seem to adequately address these complexities, and the conflict is given little 
attention by the international community and the media. Therefore, if anything is to stabilize in 
Yemen, it would need to begin with efforts from all parties, within Yemen and beyond, to find a 
solution that meets the interests of those involved better than a complete disintegration would. 
Unfortunately, however, there is next to nothing to suggest such developments in the foreseeable 
future. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex I – Historical division of Yemen 
 
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations, “Mapping the Yemen Conflict”. Available on: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen, Accessed March 1, 2018. 
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Annex II – Expansion of Houthi control (2012-2015) 
 
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations, “Mapping the Yemen Conflict”. Available on: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen, Accessed March 1, 2018. 
Annex III – Population density of Yemen 
 
Source: World Population Review, “Yemen Population 2018”. Available on: 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/yemen-population/, Accessed on: May 10, 2018. 
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Annex IV – Houthi expansion in 2015 
March 25, 2015: 
 
July 16, 2015: 
 
Source: Critical Threats, “al Houthi Areas of Influence”, July 16, 2015, Available on: 
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-houthi-areas-of-influence  
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Annex V – Zones of control in Yemen, as of April 2, 2018 
 
Source: Jeremy M. Sharp, "Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention" (Congressional Research 
Service report). Accessed on April 25, 2018. Available on: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf 
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